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Introduction
One of the many lessons offered from the current economic crisis in
the United States is that a well-functioning real estate market is built upon
a robust debt market.' Just as access to real estate capital serves as a lubri-
cant to development, lack of capital forestalls entry to integrated real estate
markets. In the evolving world economy, the marketing of domestic debt
products to international investors-and the eventual development of mort-
gage-backed securities investments-is predicated on an established
domestic-debt market.2 Indeed, real estate investors in countries with a
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1. Jonathan D. Miller, Address at Urban Land Institute: Emerging Trends in Real
Estate 2009 (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ulisf.org/docManager/10000008
57/jonathan%20miller%20Powerpoint-I 1-17-08.pdf.
2. See KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
§ 2.06 (1997).
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mature real estate market demand debt financing in a developing country
as a prerequisite to investment. The irony of this resolute insistence on
debt is that in developed countries, "hard debt" levels have declined despite
the close interconnection between the debt market and the secondary
mortgage market. 3
The secondary market for commercial real estate debt has spawned
the growth of what I call "disguised equity" financing in several forms,
including a type of lending commonly referred to as "mezzanine lending."4
In terms of secured lending, mezzanine lending is riskier than mortgage
lending but is less risky than straight equity contributions. 5 This is
because the mezzanine loan is not secured by the real estate, but is instead
secured by the owner's stake in the real estate firm.6 Upon default, the
lender may take over the owner's equity position in the firm. 7 Lenders and
borrowers in the United States have entered this mezzanine market when,
for example, debt leverage ratios have been constrained and availability of
mortgage debt is limited.8 Curiously, investors in a developing real estate
market frequently eschew equity financing and demand that a developing
real estate market make available debt financing, though these same inves-
tors readily accept quasi-equity financing (in the form of mezzanine lend-
ing) when contemplating investments in highly developed and
sophisticated markets.
As developing economies attempt to position themselves as partici-
pants in the international real estate markets, debt financing, or the lack
thereof, continues to divide the players from the spectators. 9 In this paper I
will first give a brief explanation of the importance of secured debt in real
estate financing using the market in the United States as an example.
Next, I will discuss the legal, economic, and political structures necessary
for a functioning debt market. The next step in this comparative analysis
includes an assessment of those countries that have successfully transi-
3. Indeed, one possible saving grace of the commercial real estate market in the
United States, as compared to the residential market, is the limitation on loan-to-value
ratios (LTVs). As LTVs continue to erode, it is possible that the commercial market will
become mired in confusion like its residential counterpart.
4. Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Dequity: The Blurring of Debt and Equity in
Securitized Real Estate Financing, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 233, 240-41 (2005) [hereinafter
Dequity].
5. Antonio Estache, Ellis Juan & Lourdes Trujillo, Public-Private Partnerships in
Transport 10 n.6 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4436, 2007),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW
3P/IB/2007/12/12/000158349_20071212085739/Rendered/PDF/wps4436.pdf.
6. Dequity, supra note 4, at 240.
7. Id.
8. See Theodore Sprink, Mezzanine Financing: Bridging the Funding Gap, 19 TITLE
IssuEs 1, 2 (2007) (noting that mezzanine financing is needed when there are "borrow-
ers without sufficient traditional collateral to access necessary capital and there are
many highly qualified investors attracted to filling the gap between debt and equity").
9. Hui Tang, Opportunity and Challenge of International Investment: European
and Asian Property Market 7 (2003) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Royal Institute of Tech-
nology, Stockholm, Sweden) (on file with author); see also Malcolm Knight, Developing
and Transition Countries Confront Financial Globalization, 36 FIN. & DEV. 32, 32-33
(1999).
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tioned out of an equity-based market and are now participants in the inter-
national sphere, focusing on Poland. The next section provides a
comparative analysis focusing on Latin America and including Brazil, Mex-
ico, and Argentina. Completing the circle and highlighting the paradox, I
will explain mezzanine lending, emphasizing its equity-like attributes.
Finally, I will examine the question of whether a market can "leapfrog" the
debt market and jump from equity financing straight to mezzanine
financing.
I. Importance of Commercial Debt Financing and the Origins of the
U.S. Mortgage Debt Market
A. Importance of Commercial Debt Financing
Financial leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total capital
invested. 10 Increasing leverage intensifies an owner's gain or loss through
use of borrowed funds." It likewise intensifies risk because net operating
income services the debt payment. 1 2 From an investor's perspective, how-
ever, debt financing not only allows an owner to diversify a portfolio by
investing in several projects, but it also produces a more attractive cash
yield (assuming positive leverage). 1 3 This is especially true with non-
recourse financing, which limits the extent of borrower loss to the equity
investment. 14
Debt financing in real estate is almost universally secured by a mort-
gage. 15 If the borrower defaults, the lender has the right to sell the prop-
erty (i.e., foreclose on it) and use the proceeds to repay the loan. 16
Securing the loan lowers the cost of the transaction by simultaneously
increasing the lender's enforcement rights in the event of nonpayment and
restraining future borrowing that may lessen the likelihood of repay-
ment.' 7 In essence, the real estate fundamentals of a transaction become
more predictable, thus decreasing the overall risk. Obviously, the ability to
10. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 237,
824 (7th ed. 2003).
11. Id. at 445-46.
12. See id. at 479-80.
13. Jeanne A. Calderon, Mezzanine Financing and Land Banks: Two Unconventional
Methods of Financing Residential Real Estate Projects in the 21st Century, 29 REAL EST. L.J.
283, 283 (2001). By using borrowed money to finance the property, an investor gets a
larger cash yield on equity infusion. For example, assuming a $10 million property with
a $1.5 million net operating income, the cash yield on an all cash purchase would be
15%. However, if the investor borrows $9 million at 8% interest, the cash yield is 67.2%
[$672,00 (cash flow after debt service)/$1,000,000 (cash payment)].
14. See, e.g., Sattar A. Mansi & David M. Reeb, Corporate International Activity and
Debt Financing, 33 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 129 (2002).
15. See Dequity, supra note 4, at 237.
16. Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: Analyzing Real Estate Loan
Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY L. J. 519, 526-527 (2001) [hereinafter
Subordinated Rolling Equity].
17. RonaldJ. Mann, Explaining Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REv. 625, 683
(1997).
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recoup the collateral is crucial in structured financing. 18 As will be dis-
cussed later in this paper, this reliance on debt financing is constrained in
developing markets for many reasons, including past financial crises and
economic or political instability. 19
B. Origins of the U.S. Mortgage Debt Market
While U.S. mortgage law certainly has its roots in British jurispru-
dence, significant differences emerged early in the development of U.S.
mortgage law. 20 Generally speaking, American mortgage law hinges on
the notion of granting a security interest in the land rather than a convey-
ance of title and thus limits the lender's right to pre-judgment posses-
sion. 21 As one commentator notes, a borrower's equity right of
redemption illustrates U.S. courts' reluctance to transform the essential
debt relationship into a fee interest. 2 2
Prior to the 1930s, mortgage lending was relatively constricted by high
loan-to-value (LTV) requirements and short amortization periods that lim-
ited borrowers' access to capital. 23 Central-government-market interven-
tion, however, changed the landscape in 1934 when the federal government
created the Federal Housing Administration to spur the residential market
to insure mortgage loan repayment, thus reducing the risk of default for the
originating lenders. 24 This reduced risk encouraged banks to require a
smaller down payment and to permit a longer loan repayment period.25
Capital flowed quickly into the residential market. In 2007, total origina-
tions in the residential mortgage market was estimated at $2.39 trillion.2 6
Likewise, there has been astounding growth in the commercial real
estate market. From approximately $147 billion in 1970, the market grew
to $402 billion in 1980 and to over $3.2 trillion in 2007.27 Growth in the
18. Rating agencies enhance the rating of a security that is collateralized. See Petrina
R. Dawson, Ratings Games with Contingent Transfer: A Structured Finance Illusion, 8 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 381, 382-83 (1998).
19. See infra Part I. See generally Malcolm Knight, Developing and Transition Coun-
tries Confront Financial Globalization, 36 FIN. & DEV. 32, 32-33 (1999).
20. Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. REV. 249, 266-268 (1999).
21. See id. (citing various statutes and case law to this effect).
22. Andrew R. Berman, "Once A Mortgage, Always a Mortgage"- The Use (and Misuse
oJ) Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STA '. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 76, 86-88
(2005) [hereinafter Once a Mortgage].
23. LTV generally were 50%-60% on first mortgages. DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT
TO THE COMMUNITY: COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 36 (2004).
24. Michael H. Schill, The Impact of Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice,
32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 270 (1999).
25. Burkhart, supra note 20, at 272-73.
26. Michael Fratantoni et al., The Residential Mortgage Market and Its Economic Con-
text in 2007, 2007 MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N 40, available at http://www.mortgagebank-
ers.org/files/Conferences/2007/2007LIRC/ResidentialMortgageMarketReport2007.pdf.
27. Commercial Mortgage Sec. Ass'n, Holders of Commercial & Multifamily Mortgage
Loans-Historical Data, in COMPENDIUM OF STATSTICS 21 (2009), http://www.cmsa
global.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA Site Home/IndustryResources/Research/Industry-
Statistics/CMSA-Compendium.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
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commercial market, like the residential market, was fueled by central gov-
ernment intervention. 28 In 1990, financial institutions held most of the
$1.1 trillion in mortgages. 2 9 In response to the debt crisis, the U.S. govern-
ment created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which securitized
commercial mortgages that traditional lenders owned.30
Between 1991 and 1995, the RTC securitized $18 billion in loans, with
$14 billion in the first two years alone.3 1 This restructuring of loan
income flow opened the doors of Wall Street finance to local real estate
markets. Private investment companies entered the market, further fueling
its growth.3 2 In 2007, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and
other pools were estimated to hold 28% of the $3.2 trillion mortgage
market.3 3
Currently, the repercussions of a seizing residential mortgage market
ripple through the economic crisis that continues to grip U.S. and interna-
tional financial markets. These economic problems, however, are not con-
demnations of mortgage securitization as a system, but are instead
cautionary tales of straying far afield from the primary business of sound
mortgage lending and accurate risk assessment. Mortgage underwriting
criteria that disregard the borrower's ability to repay, so-called "NINJA' '34
loans, portend disaster when these loans are the basis for rating the pay-
ment flow to bondholders. 35 Similarly destructive are the dizzying array of
derivatives that spun off of the securitization framework, each, like a bad
photocopy, carrying less and less value as compared to the original but still
maintaining the fiction of comparable value.3 6 Still, although the artifacts
surrounding the market, namely asset-backed paper that supported ware-
housing and spinning off the tranches into commercial debt obligations
(CDOs), have crumbled, the fundamental soundness of the underlying
mortgage structure is not in question.3 7 Securitization of these mortgages
awaits origination of solid quality loan products.
In contrast to the dubious lending scenarios of the residential market,
in the commercial loan arena, the lasting influence of the securitized mar-
ket on commercial lending is that the rating agencies pushed down the
28. Subordinated Rolling Equity, supra note 16, at 527-528.
29. Id. at 523.
30. Id. at 527-528.
31. Id. at 528, 531.
32. Id. at 528-29.
33. Commercial Mortgage Sec. Ass'n, The Role of Commercial Mortgage Backed Secur-
ities (CMBS) and Commercial Real Estate Collateralized Debt Obligations (CRE CDOs) in
the U.S. Real Estate Finance Market, 2007, http://www.cmsaglobal.org/uploadedFiles/
CMSA Site Home/IndustryResources/Research/IndustryOverview/CMBS%20Sum-
mary(1).pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
34. No Income No Job or Assets.
35. Martijn De Groot, NINJA Attack on the Financial Markets, 3 ZANDERS MAGAZINE:
TREASURY AND FINANCE SOLUTIONS 20, 20 (2008), http://zanders.eu/files/publications/
Zanders -magazineUKapril2008.pdf.
36. Commercial debt obligations provide a good example.
37. Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird's-Eye View: The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009:
Causes and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM
1, 2 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).
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acceptable LTV ratio.38 Whereas the imposition of the secondary market
served to raise the residential LTV above the historical 60%- 7 0%, the same
market pushed down the commercial LTV levels from 80%-90% to 65%.
39
Borrowers, due to their unquenchable thirst for leverage, as illustrated
above, sought out what has come to be known as mezzanine debt. Mezza-
nine debt is not secured by the real estate asset but by the interest in the
borrowing entity. 40 Upon default on this debt, the mezzanine lender does
not foreclose on the asset.4 1 Rather, the lender "forecloses" on the equity
interest of the borrower and takes over the ownership interest-i.e., the
equity.4 2 This sets up a notion of equity as a substitute for debt. We will
return to this idea when discussing the project capitalization pressures
faced in developing countries. 4 3
II. Foundations of a Functioning Debt Market
A strong market is constructed upon three foundational pillars: legal
protections, political stability, and economic stability. 44 Once this footing
is in place, market fundamentals can be addressed. Strong real estate
essentials of supply and demand clearly will determine the robustness of
the market.4 5 Translating this market strength into access to capital
remains the goal.
udamenuals_
Legal Poiltica Stable
Pmtecuo SWaINiy Economy
38. Brian A. Ciochetti & Timothy J. Riddiough, Understanding Commercial Mortgage
Securitization and Its Impact on Debt Financing for Retail Centers, 3 J. SHOPPING CENTER
RES. 49, 50 (1996).
39. Dequity, supra note 4, at 235.
40. Id. at 240.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See Bertrand M. Renaud, Housing Finance in Transition Economies: The Early Years
in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 1-2, 16 (The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1565, 1996) (examining the economic liberation in formerly Soviet
countries); see also MichaelJ. Lea, Prerequisites for Successful Secondary Mortgage Market:
The Role of the Primary Mortgage Market, 15 HOUSING FIN. INT'L 26, 36-40 (2000) (exam-
ining Mexico's economic transition).
45. See Renaud, supra note 44, at 8.
Vol. 42
2009 The Paradox of Commercial Real Estate Debt
A. Legal Protections
As one commentator has noted, though economic deficiencies in a
particular market may pose transaction costs, legal deficiencies can serve
as a complete transactional bar.4 6 The ideal legal environment should pro-
mote and assure transparency in the legal process to achieve stated eco-
nomic goals, thus assuring that the investor receives the benefit of the
bargain.4 7 Sometimes the underlying legal system itself may pose
problems. For example, civil law jurisdictions rely more on formal legal
codes than on equitable principles. 48 In crafting the legal parameters of a
new debt market, the scarcity of legal precedent, the uncertainty of legal
precedent, or both could introduce novel challenges. Leaving aside the
potential primary limitations of a given legal environment, a functioning
mortgage market relies on transparency of rights in several fundamental
spheres, including title, landlord-tenant, and foreclosure. 4 9
Title registration identifies the mortgaged property and assures owner-
ship.50 An owner cannot pledge an asset if title is open to conjecture. 5 1
Title problems are fatal flaws as the ownership of the property must be
unassailable for the risk to be underwritten correctly.5 2 Countries with
historically bad land title records, whether through political design, sheer
incompetence, or corruption, struggle to construct an effective mortgage
market.53
46. Yuliya A. Dvorak, Comment, Transplanting Asset Securitization: Is the Grass Green
Enough on the Other Side?, 38 Hous. L. REV. 541, 542 (2001).
47. Id. at 553.
48. See Lina Aleknaite, Why the Fruits of Capital Markets are Less Accessible in Civil
Law Jurisdictions or How France and Germany Try to Benefit from Asset Securitization, 5
DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 191, 194 (2007); Dawson, supra note 18, at 384 (noting that
for this reason civil law countries are less successful at implementing asset securitiza-
tion than common law countries); see also Loic Chiquier, Olivier Hassler & Michael Lea,
Mortgage Securities in Emerging Markets 33 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 3370, 2004) ("The development of a satisfactory legal framework for mort-
gage securities is ... often complex and time consuming (often requiring further amend-
ments), notably in civil code legislative environments where the concept of a trust may
be missing as a convenient, flexible and bankruptcy-remote special vehicle to issue mort-
gage backed securities.").
49. While areas such as tax law, bankruptcy law, and securities law are obviously
important, these areas operate above the basic requirements noted here. For the impor-
tance of these other areas see Dvorak, supra note 46, at 554-69.
50. SeeJoshua Stein, Troubled Loans: Overview, Options, and Strategy, in COMMERCIAL
REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2009: How THE WORLD CHANGED 83, 93-94 (2009).
51. Hernando de Soto, Law and Property Outside the West: A Few New Ideas About
Fighting Poverty, 29 FORUM FOR DEV. STUD. 349, 351 (2002) (Nor.).
52. Id. (noting Peruvian government's inability to garner foreign investment in com-
pany where legal title to assets was unclear).
53. See id. at 349-61 (arguing that a lack of property recording systems results in
undervalued capital assets and hinders finance by analyzing property law in Peru, Indo-
nesia, Haiti, Argentina & Russia); Dwight M. Jaffee & Bertrand Renaud, Strategies to
Develop Mortgage Markets in Transition Economies 8 (The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1697, 1996) (discussing post-Communist countries in Eastern
Europe and noting "land property boundaries were not drawn up and recorded at the
time of construction under the state system . . . [and, therefore,] [Iloans secured by real
estate lending suffer especially from the legacy of poor land titling.").
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Likewise, predictable landlord-tenant laws bolster the mortgage mar-
ket. In a commercial loan, the lender underwrites on the basis of future
and existing net operating income (NOI). 5 4 The NOI is generated through
rents and leases in the property.5 5 Fluctuations and uncertainty in the
NOI stream threaten the stability of the loan.56 Therefore, leases must
guard against such fluctuations by binding the tenant to payment and lim-
iting tenants' rights to terminate. 57 In entering the mortgage market, coun-
tries with very pro-tenant environments labor under the weight of this legal
impediment.5 8
Foreclosure laws are possibly the single most important body of juris-
prudence in terms of their effect on the mortgage market.59 At its core, the
market depends on the ability of the lender expeditiously to realize the
value of its investment by first taking possession of the property and then
selling the property to pay back the loan.60 If the legal infrastructure is
weak, investors will avoid the market due to risk aversion.61 If this occurs,
the loans will not be underwritten as secured debt, and the market will
grind to a halt.6 2
Several Latin American countries recently have streamlined and
updated their mortgage foreclosure laws. 63 Argentinean law now allows
non-judicial foreclosure and the use of summary judgment when utilizing
judicial foreclosure. 64 Changes in Mexican law have allowed lenders to
speed up the foreclosure process, from five years to six months, thus pre-
serving value in the asset.65 The Brazilian process is now more efficient
because property can be held in the name of an independent trustee
instead of the borrower.66 The lender can use non-judicial foreclosure,
54. See Robert A. Grovenstein et al., Commercial Mortgage Underwriting: How Well
Do Lenders Manage the Risks?, 14 J. HOUSING ECON. 355, 356 (2005).
55. Id.
56. See Subordinated Rolling Equity, supra note 16, at 529-30.
57. Id. at 529.
58. See Jerome A. Cohen & John E. Lange, The Chinese Legal System: A Primer for
Investors, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 345, 361-62 (1997); see also Dvorak, supra
note 46, at 559 n.93.
59. See Subordinated Rolling Equity, supra note 16, at 526-27.
60. Id. at 527.
61. Neftali Garro, Insurance Privatization in Costa Rica: Lessons From Latin America
with Special Reference to Uruguay, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 359, 377 (2000).
62. Securitization of debt requires underwriting discipline to reassure investors. See
Subordinated Rolling Equity, supra note 16, at 529 ("Underlying the entire securitized
transaction is the income stream produced by the mortgages in the pool. Not surpris-
ingly, preservation of the income stream is critical to the success of the securitization.
The overwhelming importance of the income stream reduces the real estate to a fungible
commodity. It is not the real estate that is being securitized, it is the cash-flow.").
63. Georgette Chapman Poindexter & Wendy Vargas-Cartaya, En Ruta Hacia El
Desarrollo: The Emerging Secondary Mortgage Market in Latin America, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT'L. L. REV. 257, 266-77 (2002).
64. Id. at 271.
65. Id. at 272; see Larry B. Pascal, Reforms Modernize Mexico's Financial Services
Sector, 67 TEx. BJ. 46, 46-47 (2004); Michela Scatigna & Camilo E. Tovar, Securitisation
in Latin America, 2007 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 71, 79, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r-qt0709h.pdf.
66. Poindexter & Vargas-Cartaya, supra note 63, at 273.
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which shortens the timeframe from a maximum seven years to a much
more manageable six-to-twelve months. 6 7
B. Economic Foundation
The pressures of inflation and interest rate risk pose major economic
threats to a robust mortgage market. 68 This is generally true in any mar-
ket, but the impact of these pressures is especially pronounced in countries
experiencing economic volatility. For example, fluctuating inflation rates
make it very difficult to determine the true interest rate.6 9 While a floating
interest rate may ameliorate the problem, this solution is hardly ideal in a
commercial real estate setting without appropriate caps and reset limita-
tions. This is because the operating income that provides the cash flow to
cover the debt is comprised of rents that tenants pay.70 When the rents are
fixed through the lease agreements, the cash flow is likewise limited, set-
ting up a disastrous situation in the event of an interest rate reset.
One answer may be to peg the target country's currency to a more
stable external currency. However, as the experiences in Argentina 71
(2002), Brazil72 (1999), and Mexico 7 3 (1994) demonstrate, when the tar-
get country's economy fails to perform as well as the country to which the
currency is pegged, either the peg must be adjusted or the target currency
will become overvalued. 74 The overvaluation of the target currency sets
the stage for catastrophe when the local currency eventually is unpegged
and devalued, as happened in each of the above-referenced countries. As
one commentator has noted, "currency risk does not go away merely
because one's domestic currency is pegged to the foreign currency. 75
Concealing the true cost of borrowing in this way encourages excessive
indebtedness by lenders and borrowers alike.76 Even worse, problems aris-
ing from banking unsoundness tend to show up in developing economies
67. Id. at 272.
68. See LatinFocus, Argentina: Interest Rates, 1996-2008, http://www.latin-focus.
com/latinfocus/countries/argentina/arginter.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2009) (providing
graph of interest rates in Argentina) [hereinafter Argentina Interest Rates].
69. See Bradford Cornell, Monetary Policy, Inflation Forecasting and the Term Struc-
ture of Interest Rates, 33 J. FIN. 117, 117 (1978).
70. See Hui-yong Yu, Commercial Loan Defaults May Triple as Rents Decline, BLOOM-
BERG, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=ajBU
TKShXZ7s.
71. See, e.g., Naomi Klein, Out of the Ordinary, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2005, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/j an/25/argentina.weekend7.
72. See, e.g., Bernardo Guimaraes, Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from Brazil
2 (London School of Econ., Working Paper 2008), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/
4909/i/vulnerability of currency.pegsevidence from brazil LSERO.pdf.
73. Carlos E. Zarazaga, Argentina, Mexico, and Currency Boards: Another Case of
Rules Versus Discretion, 1995 EcON. REV. 14, 14 (1995), available at http://www.dallas
fed.org/research/er/1995/er9504b.pdf.
74. Ross P. Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises: The Search for the Enduring Reforms of the
International Financial System, 6 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 34 (2001).
75. Id. at 35.
76. See id. at 39.
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suddenly and with little warning. 77 As these problems take hold, investor
confidence typically declines quickly, leading to disastrous runs on
banks. 78
C. Political Risk
The most obvious political risks are political changes that may inhibit
the enforceability of the mortgage contract. Unstable political environ-
ments undermine long-term investor confidence that is crucial to mortgage
financing. 7 9 Sovereign risk includes direct risks, such as a moratorium on
payment of certain types of debt, or indirect risks, including changes in
monetary policy that affect inflation and interest rates. 80 The concept of
sovereign risk likewise extends to acts of violence and terrorism that
inhibit confidence in the market.8 1 Insurance against political and sover-
eign risk is available.8 2 Like any other type of insurance, however, the cost
may effectively render the transaction too expensive.
A more subtle, but nonetheless important, political risk is bureau-
cracy. Like legal considerations, bureaucracy snafus inhibit the trans-
parency needed for a functioning mortgage market.8 3 With bribery at one
end of the spectrum and inefficiency at the other, dealing with governmen-
tal agencies in connection with the issuance of permits, zoning, and title
registry is an important development aspect. Corruption, for example, sig-
nals to investors instability and poor quality investment potential, thereby
impeding the likelihood of foreign investment.84 The cumulative effects of
bureaucracy can be dire for business. For example, jumbled bureaucracy
means that it can sometimes take up to five years to foreclose on a commer-
cial mortgage in Argentina.8 5
II. Transitional Economies' Access to International Real Estate
Investors
Laying the foundation of legal, economic, and political framework sig-
nals only the beginning of a local market's entrance onto the international
77. See Knight, supra note 19, at 33.
78. Id.
79. See Horst K6hler, Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund, Remarks at the Meet-
ing with Members of the Deutsche Bundestag: The Challenges of Globalization and the
Role of the IMF (Apr. 2, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2001/040201.htm.
80. See Poindexter & Vargas-Cartaya, supra note 63, at 282-83.
81. See id. at 284.
82. Comm. on Bankr. and Corp. Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 Bus. LAw. 95, 137 (2000).
83. Brian C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International
Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 159,
183 (2000).
84. Andrea Kennedy King, The Link Between Foreign Direct Investment and Corrup-
tion in Transitional Economies 8 (Aug. 22, 2003) (research essay, Carleton University),
available at http://www.transparency.az/transpfiles/12.pdf.
85. Brink Lindsey, How Argentina Got Into This Mess, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2002, at
A14.
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scene. Strong real estate fundamentals-supply of product and sufficient
demand for product-constitute the driving forces.8 6 Before discussing the
specific cases of Latin American countries and their push onto the interna-
tional market, it may be useful to contrast a country that evolved from a
non-existent market to a robust and somewhat stable international player:
Poland.
Post-communist Poland has undergone financial crises, changes in
political regimes, and frequent economic instability.8 7 It was difficult for
owners to leverage properties with debt and transaction volume was mini-
mal.88 The recent Polish market, however, looks very different. Ownership
can be financed with mortgage debt and one can even find the beginnings
of a secondary mortgage market.8 9 Foreign investors are locating offices in
Poland (e.g., GE Commercial Real Estate).90
During the 1980s, Warsaw was filled with empty lots and under-uti-
lized office space. 9 1 Some compared attempts to attract foreign capital to
develop this property with "promoting property 'on the moon."92
Although theoretically possible, mortgage financing was economically
unfeasible as interest rates hovered around 52%.93 From a political per-
spective, there were questions of title because property often was under the
control of local governments. 94 This governmental entanglement exacer-
bated already complex bureaucratic interactions. 95 Furthermore, there
86. Sorrel Downer, Latin Fever, CNBC EUR. Bus., Oct. 2008, available at http://
cnbceb.com/real-estate/latin-fever/542/.
87. See generally OLIVIER BLANCHARD, THE ECONOMICS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION
(1997) (examining economic development in Eastern Europe and Russia subsequent to
the fall of communism).
88. Jacek Laszek, Development of Housing Finance System in Poland-Lessons
Learned, 169 EKONOMSKI ANALI [EcoN. ANNALS] 62, 65-66 (2006) (Pol.).
89. See, e.g., Alicja Malecka, Malecka Capital Formations, Inc., Address in New York:
Developing Secondary Mortgage Market in Southeast Europe-Polish Mortgage Securi-
tization, Feb. 2002, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2963451/Developing-Secondary-
Mortgage-Market-in-Southeast-Europe-Sofia-Bulgaria-Polish.
90. See G.E., GE in Poland, http://www.ge.com/pl (last visited Dec. 27, 2009);
Poland's Strong Economic Growth, Low Corporate Tax & Central European Location
Attracts Foreign Investments, Bus. WIRE., Jan. 5, 2005, available at http://findarticles.
com/p/articles/mimOEIN/is_2005jan_5/ai-n8683489/ (providing a journalistic
account of the growth of the Polish market).
91. Steve LeVine & Christine Haughney, Eastern Front: Hunt for Real-Estate Profits
Takes Investors to New Frontiers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2006, at Al.
92. Id.
93. Gary Goodman & Beata Jostmeier, Attractive Real Estate Investment Opportuni-
ties in Poland, REAL ESTATE REV., Winter 1993, at 70, 70-76.
94. Poland re-established local governments in 1990 and transferred most urban
land and housing stock to them under the Act on Local Autonomy and implementing
regulations. See Cheryl W. Gray et al., The Legal Framework for Private Sector Develop-
ment in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Poland 4 (The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 800, 1991). State and local governments were then permitted to sell
the land pursuant to the amendments to the Land Use and Expropriation Act of 1990.
See id.
95. The land registration system was incomplete and in disarray, hindering mort-
gage financing. See id. at 6. Moreover, with notaries in short supply, land transaction
documents were difficult to notarize. Id.
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were no standard underwriting procedures guiding LTV ratios and debt
service guidelines. 9 6
Conditions began to change during the mid-1990s. 9 7 Just as in the
United States, governmental and quasi-governmental entities were behind
the initial formation of the Polish market.98 The World Bank, U.S. Agency
for International Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and other international funding agencies prepared programs
totaling $2.6 billion aimed at creating a Polish mortgage market.9 9
Although there still are hurdles-such as the long lag time for title registra-
tion, which sometimes can last up to six months-Poland has implemented
transformative systemic changes.' 0 0
The first steps were stabilizing the economy and reforming institu-
tions. Economic stabilization required restraining inflation and attaining
market equilibriumi' 0 1 Institutional reform involved liberalizing foreign
trade, introducing a market economy, introducing institutions, and priva-
tization. 10 2 Creating a mortgage market initially involved defining private
property rights in the Polish constitution, reprivatizing property, creating a
functioning land registration system, updating the notary system, and de-
regulating land use laws regarding planning, building standards, and rent
control. 10 3 One commentator has written that, in hindsight, the decisive
factors in these changes included "rapid commercialization of the banking
sector and intense competition among banks; ... [plarticipation of foreign
institutions; [ploor interest of the authorities in the mortgage loan system
and, as a consequence, avoidance of failure of experiments and subsidies;
[and] [p]erceptible, progressing stabilization and consumer optimism in
the largest cities .... 1104 From 2004 to 2006, foreign investment in Polish
property doubled to approximately $3.5 billion. ' 0 5 As the nation stabilizes
and modernizes, Polish real estate is becoming a more secure form of for-
eign investment.
Turning our attention to real estate markets still on the path toward
development, Latin American economies are as varied as their distinctive
local cuisine, geography, and languages. To a certain degree, though, most
of these developing countries have encouraged capital market liberalization
and financial regulation, while discouraging distortion of fiscal policies
96. MICHAEL LEA ET AL., THE RISKS OF COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING 40 (1997).
97. Retail Space in Poland, THE WARSAW VOICE, May 30, 2007, available at http://
www.warsawvoice.pl/view/14907.
98. Goodman & Jostmeier, supra note 93, at 70-76.
99. Id.
100. First Title Insurance PLC, Focus on Poland- Registration Gap Coverage in Poland,
http://www.firsttitle.eu/Press/news/focus-on-poland -registration-gap-coverage-in-
poland.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
101. David Gordon, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience, 25 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 517, 525 (1994).
102. Id.
103. See Gray et al., supra note 94, at 4-7.
104. See Laszek, supra note 88, at 69.
105. LeVine & Haughney, supra note 91, at Al.
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and disadvantageous tax schemes. 10 6 In fact, financial markets have
begun to grow in this region. 10 7 In 2003, the total amount of mortgage-
and asset-backed securitization rose to $5.6 billion, up from $3.9 billion
the previous year. 108 Nonetheless, the region lags behind other real estate
markets in access to sophisticated global capital. 10 9 To better understand
the range of development, it is helpful to contrast Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina.
A. Mexico
Mexico has the world's eleventh largest population and is currently
the thirteenth largest economy. 0 Even so, in and around 1994, the year
in which Mexico's economy was devastated by the devaluation of the Mexi-
can peso, U.S. investors were highly reluctant to enter the Mexican real
estate market."' Subsequently, "interest rates that once were almost 100
percent have declined precipitously, inflation is at about 4 percent, and
[there has] been a flood of activity by U.S. companies." 112 Since the crisis,
numerous economic policies allowed the economy to rebound and opened
the markets to foreign investors." 3 Mexican central bankers instituted
mandates to increase transparency of the government's monetary policy
decisions, stabilize the currency, and lower inflation.1 14 These measures
were successful and resulted in economic growth and enhanced foreign
direct investment. 15
Mexico's economy "has been transformed since the 1980's as a result
of economic liberalisation and joining the North American Free-Trade
106. These factors have been noted as real estate drivers in Latin America. See
Betrand Renaud, The 1985 to 1994 Global Real Estate Cycle: An Overview, 5J. REAL ESTATE
LIT. 13, 13-44 (1997).
107. See LORE & CoWAN, supra note 2, § 2:24.
108. Id.
109. As an example, less than 6% of CMBS securitized offerings were in property
outside the United States and Europe. See Commercial Mortgage Sec. Ass'n, CMBS Issu-
ance by Country, in COMPENDIUM OF STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 6.
110. See Pedro Azcue, et al., Jones Lang LaSalle, Investment Case for Mexico, ADVANCE,
2006, at 3. Mexico's population in 2008 was 106.35 million according to the World
Bank. See The World Bank, Data Profile: Mexico, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddp
reports/ViewSharedReport?&CF = 1&REPORTID=9147&REQUEST TYPE=VIEW
ADVANCED&HF=N&WSP=N (last visited Dec. 27, 2009). The World Bank valued Mex-
ico's 2008 gross domestic product at $1.085 billion. The World Bank, World Domestic
Indicators Database: Gross Domestic Products 2008 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (last visited Dec.
26, 2009).
111. Anne Field, Staking Claim Down South, RETAIL TRAFFIC, Aug. 1, 2007, at 32, 36,
available at http://retailtrafficmag.com/markets/retail-staking-claim-down/index.
html.
112. Id. at 36-37.
113. See, e.g., Gustavo A. Del Angel, Stephen Haber & Aldo Musacchio, Bank Account-
ing Standards in Mexico: A Layman's Guide to Changes 10 Years After the 1995 Bank Crisis
(Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper 08-090, 2008), available at http://www.hbs.edu/
research/pdf/08-090.pdf.
114. See id.
115. See Thomas Slover, Tequila Sunrise: Has Mexico Emerged from the Darkness of
Financial Crisis?, 5 NAFTA: LAW & Bus. REv. Am. 91, 130-33.
Cornell International Law Journal
Agreement (NAFTA)." 1 16 This agreement allowed preferential market
access for the United States, and the geographic proximity to the United
States allowed Mexico to become closely integrated in the production and
distribution system of U.S. industry, thereby raising property values. 117
This proximity distinguishes Mexico from other Latin American economies
and provides the real estate market in Mexico with significantly more inves-
tor interest for commercial properties and new real estate development." 8
Mexico is geographically distant from most large Latin American econo-
mies, and this distance keeps the country insulated from the volatility of
countries undergoing crisis. 1 19 Thus, although not fully separate from
currency crises in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Mexico has emerged as a
safer haven for investors. 120 As the capital markets integrate and become
more global, however, this distance will become insignificant.
In the present market, Mexico's open economy is attractive to inves-
tors. Indeed, Mexico currently rates strongly on a number of business
environment measures, including its political and institutional environ-
ment, macroeconomic stability, market opportunities, private enterprise
and foreign investment policies, the foreign trade and exchange regime, tax
system, financing, labor market, and infrastructure. 12 1 Along with real
estate fundamentals, real estate investors scrutinize these country-wide cri-
teria before deciding on entering a foreign market and undertaking invest-
ment risk.
Economic fundamentals are strong, with statistics as of 2007 reflect-
ing a low unemployment rate of 3.2%, GDP forecasts predict a modest
3.2% growth for 2007 and inflation at a low 4.1% in 2006.122 This eco-
nomic strength carries over to the real estate market and attracts investors
who are betting on macroeconomic and local growth.12 3 Also, a decrease
in interest rates has contributed to favorable macroeconomic variables and
helped maintain stability in the market.1 24
Given the proximity and standardization of the Mexican real estate
market, properties in Mexico are often included in U.S. CMBS securitiza-
tions, as underwriting standards make pooling across borders easier. 125
116. Azcue, et al., supra note 110, at 3.
117. M.A. HINES, INVESTING IN INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE 104 (2001).
118. See Robert P. Braubach & Robert M. Barnett, NAFTA: New Opportunities in Mexi-
can Real Estate, PROBATE & PROPERTY, Nov./Dec. 1995, at 54.
119. See generally A Real Estate Boomlet in Latin America, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, at
1-2, Sept. 22, 2004, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1042
(last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
120. See id. at 1.
121. See Mexico: Country Risk Summary, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Nov. 29,
2007.
122. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, MARKETBEAT LATIN AMERICA 33 (2007), available at
http://www.cushwake.com/cwglobal/jsp/kcReportDetail.jsp?CountrySA&Language=
EN&catld=100004&pld=c6600079p.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Id.
125. Felipe Ossa, Mexican Collateral Finds Way Into U.S. CMBS Deals, ASSET SECUm-
TIZATION REPORT, Oct. 24, 2005, at 21.
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The advent of a public securitization market lowers the cost of capital for
commercial development in Mexico, as it has in the United States, by
increasing standardization and efficiency in underwriting. 126 This indi-
cates that the Mexican real estate market has matured significantly and has
increased the liquidity of real estate while lowering debt prices.
Mexican real estate was the seventh largest destination of inter-
regional capital in 2005, indicating the increasing prevalence of foreign
investors. 127 Furthermore, as the "financial markets have stabilised and
matured, the Mexican real estate market has become increasingly sophisti-
cated."128 In 2005, Mexican banks increased their mortgage lending by
50% and tripled the issuance of mortgage-backed securities. 12 9 In the
same year, the Mexican legislature "approved a REIT-type vehicle known as
'FIBRAS'-the first vehicle of this type in Latin America.' 30 As a result,
the real estate market has experienced rental growth recovery, and many
international real estate players have capitalized on this strengthening of
fundamentals and continued yield compression. 131 Low vacancy rates and
high demand for new products drove rents up 15%-20% from 2004-06.132
The vacancy rate for Mexico City Class A offices is about 8.15%, and the
current trend in commercial real estate is developing mixed-use
projects. 13 3 Also, many domestic and international companies have been
purchasing office space in Mexico for corporate image purposes and
because of the availability of infrastructure. 13 4
Mexico must address challenges that remain in this market to increase
transparency and efficiency. Negotiating one's way through the Mexican
"bureaucracy and getting the necessary approvals is an especially laborious
process ... [as well as] a problem in purchasing land, thanks to communal
property laws dating back to 1917."'13 Because of these inefficiencies,
most international real estate investors form a joint venture with a local
developer who can more easily navigate the bureaucratic hurdles. 136 Cur-
rently, sixteen U.S. funds are investing in joint venture partnerships in
Mexico, worth a total of $6.5 billion. 13 7
Mexico's economic policy and proximity to the United States provide
economic stability that attracts foreign real estate investment and notably
reduces international risk premium.138 The sovereign risk for the country
is stable and "tight fiscal policies and good access to financing ensure that
126. Carl Kane, Fundamentals of Commercial Securitization, MORTGAGE BANKING, July
1, 1992, at 18.
127. See Azcue, et al., supra note 110, at 6.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 8.
132. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 33.
133. Id. at 27.
134. Id.
135. Field, supra note 111, at 38.
136. See id. at 37.
137. Id. at 32.
138. Id.
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the risk of debt-servicing difficulties is low .... ,,139 Overall, the real estate
market in Mexico is highly advanced relative to its Latin American neigh-
bors, with sophisticated international real estate developers and financiers
involved in the market.140 The government's economic policy initiative
was successful in helping the economy rebound after the crisis and open-
market policies with the United States boosted investor confidence and
interest in Mexico.141
B. Brazil
Brazil is the largest country in South America and controls about half
of the GDP of the continent. 14 2 According to economists, "Brazil will grow
to be the world's [eighth] largest economy by 2020 and the [fifth] largest by
2050."'14 3 This expansion will be the result of "favorable demographic
trends." 144 Specifically, economists anticipate that a "younger working
population . .. [will] increase the country's productivity and drive eco-
nomic growth."'145 From a real estate perspective, this creates inexhaust-
ible demand for real property from businesses catering to the population.
Brazil's economy fell into a deep recession with inflation soaring to an
all-time high of 2,938% in 1990.146 The 1994 Real Plan, devised in the
wake of the recession, created conditions for a more stable domestic econ-
ony. 14 7 It introduced a new currency, tightened monetary policy while
loosening fiscal policy, and created incentives to attract foreign invest-
ment. 148 The plan was widely successful, but a growing deficit, overvalua-
tion of the real, stock market losses, and rising interest rates followed a few
years later. 14 9 Brazil's currency collapsed in the aftermath of the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997.150 In response, the IMF initiated a $41 billion
bailout to help stem the tide. 15 1 Unfortunately, it was unsuccessful, and
the Central Bank of Brazil was forced to devalue the currency in 1999,
allow the real to float, and tighten monetary control. 15 2 The economy
139. See Mexico: Country Risk Summary, supra note 121, at 1.
140. See Azcue, et al., supra note 110, at 6.
141. See Slover, supra note 115, at 131-33.
142. See Field, supra note 111, at 32.
143. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 3.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See NADIA TEMPINI MACDONALD, MACROECONOMICS AND BUSINESS: AN INTERACTIVE
APPROACH 217 (1999).
147. See Andre Averbug, The Brazilian Economy in 1994-1999: From the Real Plan to
Inflation Targets, 25 WORLD ECON. 925, 926-32 (2002).
148. Jorge M. Guira, Preventing and Containing International Financial Crisis: The Case
of Brazil, 7 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 481, 488 (2001).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Ilene Grabel, Mexico Redux? Making Sense of the Financial Crisis of
1997-98, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 375 (1999).
151. See Ian Vdsquez, Breathing New Life Into Era of Bailouts, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2002, at B03.
152. See Grabel, supra note 150, at 378.
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improved until 2002, when inflation suddenly increased five-fold. 153 Fis-
cal responsibility and macroeconomic stability, together with continued
interest in the country by the financial community, helped improve eco-
nomic fundamentals. 154 One important impetus driving economic growth
and stability was the sound macroeconomic policy framework that sup-
ported a sustainable decline in country risk.' 5
5
The Brazilian economy recovered following its currency crisis; growth,
combined with low inflation and strong economic policy, helped attract
investors and foreign direct investment. 156 A comparison of Brazil's infla-
tion rate with that of Argentina clearly reflects Brazil's economy recovery.
For example, in 2006, inflation in Brazil was about 3.4%, compared with
10% in Argentina. 15 7 The Brazilian government has set the maximum
inflation target at 4.5%, and inflation has been below this target since
2005.158 Brazil's strong external appeal has resulted in a strong currency,
allowing for deflation and declining interest rates, which decrease the
opportunity cost of capital and raise demand for money by households
and foreign investors. 15 9 Unemployment is high at around 8.0%, but this
figure may be a reflection of the sheer size of the population and the ineffi-
ciencies of emerging economies. 160
Drivers for domestic demand remain positive, and GDP growth fore-
casts have risen steadily throughout the year, to 4.9% for 2007 and 4.3%
for 2008.161 A Brazilian risk assessment states that the currency risk is
stable, and "there remains the risk of volatility in the event of global finan-
cial market turbulence, but a prolonged overshooting is unlikely, given the
confidence in policy framework, high real interest rates and strong external
accounts."'16 2 Given the improved macroeconomic environment, Brazil's
currency risk has been at a record low in the past year, reducing the overall
risk for real estate investing. 163
153. Ednei Roza, The IMF and the Effects of Structural Conditionalities in Brazil: What
is About to Happen?, 14 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 347, 355 (2008).
154. See id.
155. See Scatigna & Tovar, supra note 65, at 75.
156. Dan Shirai, Chasing Brazil's Yields, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 10, 2007, at 56,
56-58; see also Dan Shirai, Brazil Land Grab Heats Up, LATIN FIN., Apr. 1, 2008, at 10-13
[hereinafter Brazil Land Grab].
157. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 3.
158. See Banco Central Do Brasil, Hist6rico de Metas para a Infla~do no Brasil [Histori-
cal Inflation Targets in Brazil], http://www.bcb.gov.br/Pec/metas/TabelaMetaseR-
esultados.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2009).
159. See Brazil Land Grab, supra note 156, at 10-13.
160. See Elzio Barreto & Brian Ellsworth, Brazil's Jobless Rate Unexpectedly Falls in
July, FORBES, Aug. 20, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/08/20/
afx6798427.html.
161. Dennis Wilson, The World Economic Outlook for 2008 (International Monetary
Fund), ENTREPRENEUR, Winter-Spring 2008, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/
tradejournals/article/179031787_l.html (distilling IMF country data).
162. Brazil: Country Risk Summary, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Apr. 16, 2007, at
1.
163. See Brazil: Country Risk Summary, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Jan. 17, 2008,
at 22.
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This strengthening of economic fundamentals has been accompanied
by progress in the real estate investment market. 164 Improvements in the
structure and enforceability of lease contracts are enabling the securitiza-
tion of lease receivables, thus providing new financing options for institu-
tional investors and introducing a new source of capital for real estate
investment. 165 The structured finance market has recently improved. 166
The general legal framework for Brazil's structured finance market provides
for two special purpose vehicles (SPVs): Fundos de Investimento em Direitos
Credit6rios (FIDCs)-asset-backed investment funds-and Certificados de
Recebfveis Imobilidrios (CRIs)-real estate-backed certificates. 16 7 Accord-
ing to commentators, "FIDCs act as bankruptcy-remote entities separate
from the originators of the assets that protect against an originator's credi-
tors. CRIs provide for the isolation of assets and protection against seller/
originator creditors, but not against fiscal and labor related claims of the
securitization agent."' 68 These long-term-asset-backed debt alternatives
are beginning to emerge and provide further alternatives for investing. 1 69
In 1997, the Brazilian Real Estate Financing System introduced the
fiduciary lien on real estate loans, representing an alternative to traditional
mortgages that are costly and difficult to recover in the event of default. 17 0
This law also expedited real estate foreclosures, increasing the recovery
value of entering foreclosure and establishing a fiduciary regime for receiv-
ables collateralizing a specific debt issue. 17 1 These important regulations
improve real estate market conditions for investors by increasing security
for mortgage lenders and landlords.
Brazil's economic size and growth attracts aggressive real estate inves-
tors because of the potential for high returns. 1 72 Prudential Real Estate
Investors estimates the value of the high-grade commercial real estate mar-
ket in Brazil at $497 billion, which makes it the largest in South
164. See Ana Beatriz Barbosa, Real Estate Acquisition in Brazil-A Brief Summary,
MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Dec. 21, 2007.
165. See Roberto Watanabe, The Evolution of FIDCs in Brazilian Securitization,
MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.moodys.com.br/brasil/pdf/Spe-
cialCommentBrazilSecuritization_2005_English.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2009).
166. Dan Shirai, Digging Up Real Assets, LATIN FIN., Apr. 1, 2007, at 20, 22 ("Real
estate is another emerging asset class with enormous potential for deal flow. Last year,
MBS accounted for... 8% [of securitizations] in Brazil, according to Standard Bank....
[V]olume [is expected] to multiply by several times through the use of CMBS and
RMBS.").
167. See Greg Kabance & Eduardo D'Orazio, Securitization in Latin America: Tax and
Legal Regimes, LATIN AMERICA Q., Nov. 2007, at 20, available at http://www.fitchrat-
ings.cl/Upload/klatll07.pdf; see also Scatigna & Tovar, supra note 65, at 75.
168. Kabance & D'Orazio, supra note 167, at 20.
169. See Dan Freed, U.S. Institutions Eye Brazilian Real Estate, INVESTMENT MANAGE-
MENT WEEKLY, April 24, 2006, at 1; Scatigna & Tovar, supra note 65, at 75.
170. See Levy & Salomdo Advogados, Brazilian Real Estate Law Aims to Stimulate Mar-
kets, INTER-AMERICAN TRADE REPORT, Jan. 23, 1998, at 1, 1-2, available at http://natlawip.
abra.info/bulletin/1998/r9801/980123a.htm.
171. See Kabance & D'Orazio, supra note 167, at 20.
172. See Dbora Morilha, Brazil, REAL ESTATE PORTFOLIO, Nov./Dec. 2005, http://
www.nareit.com/portfoliomag/05special/p75.shtml (noting the interest of Equity Inter-
national and others in investing in the Brazilian real estate market).
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America. 173 The debt market is not well established, however, so high
equity investments lower the yields of the properties. 1 7 4 A majority of
investors think "'Brazil is about two or three years behind Mexico. Debt is
increasingly available, and yields are coming down'.... Many of Brazil's
corporate leases were negotiated a few years ago when the country's econ-
omy was weaker, so rents will have considerable room to rise as those
leases roll over .... -175 Though debt accessibility is a challenge in the
Brazilian real estate market, the debt market has shown growth recently. 176
As in Mexico, developers face the challenge of navigating the bureaucratic
laws of Brazil. Brazil also has "a complex system of federal, state, and
municipal taxes, as well as tough environmental rules."'17 7 Recently, devel-
opers have seen a change in the credit conditions in Brazil and most expect
the availability of debt financing to increase further in the future, along
with a continued decline in interest rates. 17 8
Given the low availability of debt financing in Brazil's history, the mar-
kets in the major areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have been character-
ized by owner-occupied real estate. 179 Organic growth of the market,
driven by companies looking for new, larger, and better located properties
has resulted in many sale-leaseback opportunities.1 8 0 Though Brazilian
pension funds historically have been major investors and owners of corpo-
rate real estate, recent legislation limiting pension fund allocation of assets
to real estate has forced these large investors to sell properties. 18 1 Overall
vacancy for Sao Paulo is 12.5%, and the lack of quality space is forcing
many companies to move out of the central business districts. 18 2 Demand
is very strong in the market, but buying opportunities are limited.18 3
The demographic characteristics and size of the country make poten-
tial growth of the economy very attractive to investors, who bet on the
demand side of the real estate market. As seen in recent real estate transac-
tions, multi-national real estate developers have created joint ventures to
explore the opportunities in Brazil. 18 4 Though the price of the property
may be diminished to compensate for market risk, investors are able to
173. Id.
174. Freed, supra note 169, at 1-2.
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id.
177. See Field, supra note 111, at 38.
178. See Brazil Land Grab, supra note 156, at 10-13.
179. Steve Bergsman, Management with a Latin Accent, 63 J. PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
70, 70 (1998).
180. See id.
181. See James Attwood & Alexander Ragir, Peru Stocks Decline Most in 12 Years as
Miners Fall, BLOOMBERG, May 30, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20
601086&sid=awZg5JGhsBOA&refer=latin america (noting that stock rose in Brazil after
regulators eased investment rules for pension funds, allowing them to invest in riskier
assets and to increase holdings of asset-backed securities).
182. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 5.
183. See id. at 3, 7 (stating that vacancy rates in Sao Paulo, which had reached 22% in
2004, fell to 12.5% by the end of 2006).
184. See Morilha, supra note 172, at 1 (noting that multinational real estate investors
are exploring opportunities in Brazil).
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earn the return they want even without leveraging capability.' 8 5 Credit
markets are improving and transaction volume continues to increase as
investment funds come into the market for short- and long-term
opportunities. 18
6
C. Argentina
Argentina has the third largest Latin American economy, behind Mex-
ico and Brazil, and a population of 38.64 million.1 8 7 The country not only
has undergone prolonged and recent economic crises that have slowed the
development of a real estate market, but the country also has been infected
by the crises in neighboring Latin American countries.' 88 From 1998 to
2002, Argentina's economy was mired in recession and the country's reli-
ance on foreign investment compounded a fixed exchange rate system that
limited the government's ability to stimulate the economy. 18 9 In 1999, "the
devaluation of the Brazilian [real dealt a major blow to Argentina's exports
as well as the incomes of Argentine real estate companies with Brazilian
interests," such as IRSA (Inversiones y Representaciones Sociedad
Anonima). 19° The economy grew unstable and fell into recession with a
growing budget deficit, and the Argentine government defaulted on its sov-
ereign debt.19 1 In 2001, the government devalued the Argentine peso as
capital flight from the country continued, and, in 2002, the government
eliminated the fixed peg of the peso to the U.S. dollar.' 92 The peso eventu-
ally recovered some of its value through an expansion of exports and a
boost in demand for domestic products.19 3 The country rebounded to a
limited extent, with GDP growing approximately 9% from 2002 to 2007.194
This growth, however, is expected to slow in the near future. 19 5
After an initial recovery, the Argentine economy is not faring as well as
185. Freed, supra note 169, at 2 (yields can reach "as high as 20% without leverage").
186. See Morilha, supra note 172, at 1.
187. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 8.
188. See Morgan Deal & Carlos Rosso, Foreign Investment in Latin American Real
Estate: A Comparison of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 6 (Sept. 19, 2001) (unpublished
Masters thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. Associated Press, Argentine Peso Released from Link to U.S. Dollar, USA TODAY,
Feb. 11, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2002-02-11-argentina-
peso.htm.
193. MARK WEISBROT & Luis SANDOVAL, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL'Y RES., ARGENTINA'S
ECONOMIC RECOVERY: POLICY CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS 3 (2007), available at http://
www.cepr.net/documents/publications/argentina-recovery_2007-10.pdf.
194. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Argentina, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html#Econ (last visited
Dec. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Factbook].
195. See, e.g., Michael Mussa, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute, Presentation at semi-
annual meeting on Global Economic Prospects: Global Economic Prospects 2007/2008:
Slowing to Sustainable Growth 8 (April 4, 2007), available at http://www.peterson-insti-
tute.org/publications/papers/mussa04O7.pdf.
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its Latin American counterparts after their economic crises. 19 6 The Argen-
tine economy "is still showing positive growth and expansion although at a
slower pace than previous years. The lack of investment makes this growth
unsustainable over the long term."'197 GDP growth in 2006 and 2007 was
strong at around 8%, but expected growth for 2008 declined and is at
6.8%.198 Furthermore, despite the government's effort to lower inflation,
sharp increases in prices continue to be one of the most challenging issues
facing the economy for future years. 199 Inflation soared into double-digits
in 2006, and shows few signs of decline. 20 0 This high inflation is one of
the risks that deter investors from the commercial real estate market in
Argentina, and it eliminates the possibility of a sensible debt market to
leverage properties. 20 1
The real estate market remained inactive until 2004.202 The current
real estate market can be characterized by low vacancy rates and an
increase in recycling of Class B/C buildings. 20 3 Class A vacancy rates con-
tinue to remain below 5% and are expected to increase to a level between
10%-15% with the introduction of new developments. 20 4 Although local
investors have increased their activity, few international investors are active
participants in the Argentine real estate market.20 5 In short, most of the
"real estate investment in Buenos Aires continues to be a speculative
undertaking. '20 6
Argentina, like other Latin American countries, is known for laws pro-
viding the tenant with more benefits than the landlord.20 7 The tenant has
early termination rights, the standard being a six-month notice with no
penalties, which continue to "pose a risk for office investors. '20 8 Further-
more, the leases have short three-year terms that need to be renegotiated as
the currency depreciates, are indexed to inflation, or are denominated in
U.S. dollars. 20 9 This short-term contract requires frequent tenant searches
196. See Countries and Consumers, Regional Focus: Latin America More Resilient to the
Global Downturn Than in 2001-2002, EUROMONITOR INT'L, Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.
euromonitor.com/Articles.aspx?folder-=RegionalFocusLatinAmericamoreresilient_
tothe.global downturn than in_2001_2002&print=true.
197. CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 8.
198. See Mussa, supra note 195, at 18; Factbook, supra note 194.
199. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 8 (noting that there are significant
problems in Argentina with trying to keep down inflation).
200. See Factbook, supra note 194.
201. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 9.
202. See Reynolds Real Estate Argentina, Concise Report on the Argentine Market, May
14, 2007, http://www.argentinahomes.com/real-estate-market/view-article.php?id=23
(noting that after a period of problems, construction levels began to rise in 2004).
203. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 8.
204. See id. at 9.
205. See id.
206. CB RICHARD ELLIS, MARKET OUTLOOK: BUENOS AIRES OFFICE INVESTMENT MARKET 3
(2007) (noting that a "volatile economy and tenant friendly laws" prevent formation of
conditions favorable to "investment into income producing assets.") [hereinafter MARKET
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and increases the risk for the property owner, who has to re-lease and may
be burdened with unoccupied space for long periods of time.2 10 The fre-
quent options to purchase or rights of first refusal held by many tenants
present even more problems.
2 1 1  
'
The industrial and retail markets face a similar lack of investment and
quality space.2 12 Vacancy rates in these property sectors continue to
decline, and there is high demand for space. 2 13 In the retail market, "the
most important shopping malls have tenant waiting lists and landlords
choose their next tenant based on their probable sales."'2 14 Thus, although
there is significant shortage in supply, the risks of the market are too high
for foreign investors to pour money in to create new developments; they
tend to propose build-to-suit projects to eliminate tenant risk.21 5
This situation is exacerbated by the lack of a debt market in Argen-
tina.2 16 Real estate capitalization rates need to be high enough to warrant
a full equity investment or the developers will not be able to reap the yields
with leverage. 2 17 The government offers the only available debt, which is
unsecure and offered at prohibitively high interest rates. 2 18 It is not accre-
tive to borrow against the property and most investors pay with full
equity.219 The real estate market also is fairly illiquid, with low transac-
tion volume due to the risks of the market.220 The low liquidity makes it
difficult for owners to sell properties and for developers to have reliable
exit strategies.22' This makes market prices very challenging to predict
because few properties are marked-to-market by going onto the seller's
block.2 22
IV. Paradoxical Financing
In these emerging economies-and especially in countries less inte-
grated into the global capital market, such as Argentina-predicating
investment on the creation of a debt market continues to hinder further
growth. 22 3 Even if legal mechanisms, such as an unassailable mortgage,
can be developed, the economic realities of uncertainty limit their use.
224
To compensate for the lack of debt, many structures employing equity have
210. See MARKET OUTLOOK, supra note 206, at 3-4.
211. See id.
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evolved to simulate debt and allowed real estate investment to continue,
albeit at a slow pace. 2 25 Hence the paradox: in the absence of leverage,
these markets are too risky for low risk investors, but the returns on the
unleveraged market are not high enough for high risk investors.
Attracted by the strong fundamentals of the commercial real estate
market in Argentina, local and regional investors purchase commercial
property using creative investment financing structures to bypass the inac-
cessible debt market and maximize risk-adjusted returns.226 However,
many foreign players are discouraged by the multiple risks of the Argentine
market.22 7 The high interest rates for long-term commercial loans in
Argentina range from 16% to 20%.228 This high cost of capital is prohibi-
tive for many investors. Therefore, these investors must turn to equity,
which they often use in an attempt to replicate debt.
In Argentina, and often in Brazil, long-term debt financing is not a
viable option for owners of commercial property.229 In these countries,
the most commonly used structure for investing in real estate is direct own-
ership through full equity investment using a condominium structure for
office buildings.230 Under this self-financing structure, "the buyer of an
apartment or office floor will often pay a down payment around 5% and
approximately 50% of the purchase price in monthly installments during
construction, with the balance due [at] completion."' 231 This method com-
pensates for the lack of debt and provides the developer with construction
financing to reduce his own equity investment.232 With this structure, the
developer invests in the property once, when about 20% of the pre-sales are
complete, and will then draw from the equity owners as construction pro-
gresses. 233 The scheme mimics a construction loan with individual "lend-
ers" providing a pool of equity to draw from as needed.234
Once the office floor or unit is sold, the purchaser owns the real estate
and has the right to rent and improve it, creating office buildings with own-
ership divided by floor, unit, and wing.23 5 Investors with substantial
equity can invest in these countries without debt financing, but smaller
players are unable to become active, reducing potential market growth.
This investment structure offers an alternative to long-term financing and
short-term construction loans, but also lowers the overall return for devel-
opers. Nevertheless, these sell-out schemes are profitable compared to
Insolvency Law in Argentina and the U.S.: Gaining Insight From A Comparative Perspective,
30 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 393, 408-10 (2002).
225. See Deal & Rosso, supra note 188, at 40-49 (outlining the availability of financ-
ing options, alternative financing schemes, and secondary markets).
226. Id. at 42-44.
227. See CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, supra note 122, at 9.
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leveraging a property with high-interest financing.236
The aforementioned paradox arises when foreign investors shy away
from this type of equity financing, concluding that it would not produce a
high enough return, while simultaneously shunning the market for being
too risky for traditional debt leverage. In the present U.S. market, there is a
large and robust mezzanine loan market that depends on the same princi-
ples of equity financing. 237 Obligors on the note are the equity holders of
the borrower-not the mortgage borrower itself. 238 As such, in the event of
default, the mezzanine lender "forecloses" on the equity in the borrower
and would assume ownership of the property. 239 While the mortgage bor-
rower owns the underlying real estate asset, the mezzanine borrower only
owns the equity component in the mortgage borrower.240
Can these developing markets "leap frog" the debt stage and go
straight to mezzanine financing? 241 From an economic perspective, capital
structure should not affect value, which should be independent of debt-
versus-equity capitalization decisions. 242 In reality, however, target debt
levels are most likely influenced by the probability of financial distress.
Companies with higher risk-economic, political, or legal-should be
expected to use less debt and, logically, more equity. This is exactly the
position of real estate firms in these developing economies. Mezzanine
financing cuts the middle path by opening up markets to third parties
while acknowledging that the risk profile of the firm will not support debt.
The mezzanine lending market grew in the United States in response
to the limitation on debt financing in many securitized transactions. 243
Just as mezzanine lending developed from limitations on debt financing in
the United States, this type of systemized equity financing can begin to
replace the reliance on debt in other countries. In fact, some have com-
mented that equity investment is preferable to recipient nations in light of
the risk- and loss-sharing mechanisms triggered by debt financing. 244
Mezzanine financing is closer to equity because the value of the "collateral"
236. Id. at 42-43.
237. In 2006 issuances of mezzanine debt in CDOs valued approximately $3.22 bil-
lion. See DANIEL B. RUBOCK, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, STRUCTURED FINANCE: US CMBS
AND CRE CDO: MOODY'S APPROACH TO RATING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE MEZZANINE
LOANS 2 (2007).
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derives solely from ownership in the mortgage borrower. 2 45
The choice between equity (current financing schemes) and debt
(straight mortgage) is not dichotomous. There is a range of financing alter-
natives that exists between these poles.2 46 Mezzanine financing is one
such choice. Unlike other commentators, 24 7 I do not contend that mezza-
nine financing is a mortgage substitute. Rather, it offers an alternative to
debt that will, nonetheless, allow investors in developing economies to par-
ticipate in foreign investment. Clearly, the pricing must reflect the
increased risk; foreclosing on an equity interest is not the economic
equivalent of foreclosing on a real estate asset.248 Indeed, the value of this
investment can be analogized to "reverse strike" price in a convertible
security.2 49 While the price of a convertible security generally would
reflect the likelihood of an increase in value, here it is the likelihood that
the value will not decrease.
250
The fact remains that, despite legal changes that have been imple-
mented in several developing economies, economic realities still preclude
the growth of a robust mortgage market. Countries such as Argentina and,
with fewer exigencies, Brazil and Mexico should consider implementing
legal groundwork that would smooth the path for this type of financing.
As a fundamental issue, restrictions on foreign ownership must be eradi-
cated. 25 1 The value of this financing is contingent upon the ability to fore-
close on the on equity interest. Next, legal and regulatory changes must
occur to solidify the lien of the mezzanine lender on the equity interest.
25 2
The foundational document in the United States is the UCC-1 Financing
Statement. 25 3 This document is filed in the appropriate state recording
office and ensures that the lender's lien is effective and superior to third-
party claims.25 4 States should adopt and enforce requirements for such
filings. In this way, markets that are closed to traditional debt financing
still have the opportunity to access global capital.
Conclusion
Foreign investment will assist the real estate markets of developing
nations in becoming competitive in the global marketplace. The market
fundamentals, demand, and infrastructure are in place to set the stage for a
real estate boom. The evolving global economy hungers for the marketing
of domestic financing products to international investors. 2 55 Debt is not
245. See Risks and Realities, supra note 240, at 995.
246. See Once a Mortgage, supra note 22, at 106.
247. See id. at 113.
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the only path to access international capital. Though legal, political, and
economic stability remain crucial building blocks, strong real estate funda-
mentals should prod the market toward exploring alternative methods of
finance. As in the United States, when debt is not an alternative, the power
of structured equity financing cannot and should not be dismissed.
